We develop a theoretical framework aimed to model the pricing of electronic cash cards and the market domain in which these cards will be used in an environment where charge cards and currency (the legal tender) are competing payment media. We also investigate whether the adoption of the various payment media generates an underutilization or overutilization of the electronic cash cards relative to currency. MODERN ECONOMIES use a wide variety of means of payments. The most widely used payment instruments today are currency, payment orders, checks, debit cards, and credit cards. Among these means of payments only currency, which is legal tender, provides for an immediate final settlement of the transaction in which it is used. The others are linked to the payers' bank accounts or credit lines extended by the card issuers. All these prevailing means of payment suffer from major weaknesses stemming from their high handling costs. In the case of currency these costs are generated by the physical handling and storing of notes and coins. In the case of account-linked instruments the costs are generated by the credit verification, bookkeeping, and communication with the central operators of the system. Due to the cost structure, currency is still the dominating means of payment in small transactions, whereas the account-based instruments are used mainly for medium-sized and large transactions.
The disadvantages of using currency include first the inconvenience of sending it to remote places. Most mail carriers do not insure envelopes valued beyond $100. Second, currency value cannot be divided. That is, a $50 bill cannot be split into units of $10 unless an exchange or a transaction is performed in order to get change. As often happens, stores, restaurants and even vending machines are unable to deal with largedenomination notes. Third, storage and sorting the notes impose a great cost on consumers, retailers, and banks. For these reasons banks always impose higher fees on the exchange of foreign currency notes compared to foreign deposit money.
Most of the literature on the coexistence of different payment instruments is focused on the different positive or negative rates of return associated with holding on the different payment media. Several empirical studies have documented international differences in payment systems (see Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala 1996, and Hatakka 1998) .
The theoretical literature on the coexistence of different traditional payment instruments goes back to the transaction demand for money argument; see, for example, Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) . Over the years, this opportunity-cost approach has been extended to include the demand for checks, charge cards, and credit cards [see Santomero (1979) and Whitesell (1989 Whitesell ( , 1992 and their references]. A more general extension to include an arbitrary number of payment instruments is given by Santomero and Seater (1996) . General equilibrium approaches to coexistence are given in Romer (1986) and Prescott (1987) .
In this paper we wish to contribute to this literature by focusing on the electronic cash card as a substitute for currency and debit and credit cards in POS transactions. We will utilize an optimization approach and focus on fee structures implemented by card issuers. For simplicity we abstract from checks despite the fact that checks are widely used in the United States, since checks and debit cards have common features in terms of clearing (although, from buyers' point of view, they may take longer to write). The present version of this paper also abstracts from analyzing the investment, setup, and equipment costs needed for the establishment of the electronic cash card service [see Shy and Tarkka (1998) for such calculations].
Section 1 of this paper introduces an economy in which transactions can take place with currency, charge cards, or electronic cash cards. We characterize the transaction domains of each type of payment media for exogenously given fee structures imposed by the various card issuers. Section 2 characterizes the transaction domains of each payment media in the absence of fees imposed by electric cash cards and charge card issuers, and provides a welfare evaluation of these domains. Section 3 formulates the procedures under which the issuers of electronic cash cards and charge cards set their fees on merchants and buyers. Section 4 summarizes our results.
A MODEL OF ELECTRONIC CASH CARDS, CURRENCY, AND CHARGE CARDS
Consider an economy in which a wide variety of POS transactions are made in a given period. The transactions vary in value, that is, some are small in value such as buying a newspaper from a newspaper stand or a machine, and some are larger, say filling up a gas tank, buying an electrical appliance and so forth.
In order for electronic cash cards to be widely adopted as a means of payment, they will need to offer enough features of value to their three constituencies: buyers, merchants, and the card issuers. For this reason, in our model there are four types of interacting agents: (i) Buyers (consumers) who wish to buy goods and services from merchants. (ii) Merchants who can be identified as stores, vending-machine owners, and basically all commercial service providers doing POS business. Actually, we expect that vending machines and other unattended service providers could play a major role in electronic cash card transactions. (iii) Electronic cash card issuer who can supply electronic cash card equipment and transaction services to buyers and merchants. (iv) Charge card issuer who issues charge cards and provides the related services.
Merchants and Buyers: The Space of Transaction Values
We denote by t, t Ͼ 0, a particular transaction value that is the amount of money transferred from a buyer to a merchant during the purchase. We assume that each merchant specializes in one size of transaction only. Thus, we refer a merchant specializing in selling goods valued at t as a type-t merchant. Let m(t) denote the continuous density of merchants over the t-axis, which is interpreted as describing the "number" of merchants performing transactions valued each at t. For example, m(35¢) is the "number" of points selling the daily newspaper (assuming that no other good is priced at 35¢).
On the buyers' side, let b(t) denote the density of buyers over the t-axis, which, again, is interpreted as describing the total "number" of consumers who access merchants of type t and pay for goods or services valued at t. Altogether, the ratio b(t)/m(t) is the number of buyers per merchant who provides a product or a service valued at t.
Electronic Cash Card Issuers
Electronic cash card issuers do not incur any significant transaction-specific cost. In this respect, electronic cash card issuers resemble central banks that are not directly involved in individual transactions performed with notes and coins.
We assume that issuers of electronic cash cards impose an annual fee of f A M→E on each participating merchant, and an annual fee of f A B→E on each buyer who holds such a card. Notice that, unlike charge card issuers analyzed below, electronic cash card issuers cannot levy transaction-based fees since electronic cash card transactions are not recorded in any central registry.
Charge Card Issuers
In contrast to an electronic cash card transaction, a charge card transaction is costly to the issuer since it requires a credit verification of the buyer with the card issuer's main computer system and perhaps the buyer's bank. Therefore, we assume that the issuer of a charge card bears a per-transaction cost of V C , where V stands for verification. Notice that this cost is per transaction and is therefore independent on the size of the transaction since the transaction size is irrelevant for the cost of credit verification. We believe that this per-transaction cost plays a crucial role in the introduction of e-money and the maintenance of currency as it makes charge card payments uneconomical for small transactions.
We assume that issuers of charge cards can impose three types of fees on merchants and buyers. (i) They may impose an annual fee of f A M→C on each participating merchant, and an annual fee of f A B→C on each buyer who holds such a card.
(ii) Since charge card issuers face a credit verification cost of V C per transaction, they may impose a fee of f T M→C on merchants and f T B→C on buyers for every request for credit verification (practically, for every transaction made). (iii) They have an option of imposing a proportional fee on a transaction of size t equals to t · f M→C and t · f B→C , respectively.
Merchants
A merchant selling a product valued at t is faced by b(t)/m(t) identical customers. The merchant must accept currency if the buyer offers it, since currency is the (only) legal tender in this economy. In addition, each merchant has the option of accepting electronic cash cards and charge cards if they find it profitable to do so.
In what follows, we make some assumptions on the costs merchants must bear when accepting each medium of payment.
• Currency: Accepting currency for the trade subjects the merchant to three types of costs:
Loss of time to perform a single transaction, denoted by τ R M (R for currency), which is the value of time associated with accepting currency notes and coins, counting it, checking for counterfeits, and handing out the change to the customer.
(ii) Expected loss with probability 0 Յ λ R M Յ 1 (which includes robbery and misplacement). (iii) Foregone interest, i · t, for the time which a merchant keeps the currency at his possession, where i is the exogenously-determined market interest rate. Altogether, a merchant who is engaged in a transaction of size t and uses currency will face a per-transaction cost of (1) It is important to emphasize that the currency notes and coins bear no fees to any party of the transaction since the cost of printing and maintaining notes and coins is borne by the central bank.
• Electronic cash cards: Just as in the case of currency, merchants incur loss of time and foregone interest cost. Altogether, the (physical) cost borne by a type t merchant associated with an electronic cash card transaction is
tion, a merchant who accepts electronic cash cards must pay an annual fee of f A M→E to the issuer.
• Charge cards: We capture the essence of a charge card transaction by assuming that merchants are operating on-line; hence, debit and credit entries are instantaneously updated. Thus, no foregone interest to the merchant is created. Thus, the only (physical) cost borne by the merchant is the value of time spent on charging the buyer and verifying the card's credit status, τ C M . In addition, the costs to a merchant who accepts charge cards may include an annual fee, 
Assumption 1 is motivated by the following facts. Each currency transaction involves (i) Taking money out of the purse which may involve using two different wallets, a wallet for currency notes, and a wallet for currency coins. (ii) The cashier then counts the money (notes and coins), and checks for counterfeits. (iii) The cashier then sorts notes and coins and places them separately into the drawer of the cash register. (iv) The cashier then has to sort out notes and coins and hand them back to the buyer as change. (v) The buyer has to count the change (notes and coins) in order to make sure that he was not cheated. (vi) The buyer then sorts the notes and coins and inserts them into (possibly) separate wallets. In contrast, charge cards transactions require only insertion and punching in a four-digit code (if any), and then taking them out, and waiting for the credit verification process to end in order to sign for the charge. Note that there is no need to sort out coins from notes, and that there is no need to count any change. Finally, electronic cash card transactions may be less time consuming than charge card transactions since they do not require any credit verification with the bank. From the above description we infer that a currency transaction is less costly than a charge card transaction for a type t merchant if Note that merchants divide the annual fee set by the issuer of the charge card by the number of transactions they face, b(t)/m(t). These transactions (merchants) should be sufficiently small satisfying
Similarly, the merchants who find electronic cash card transactions less costly than currency transactions satisfy or
Note that tˆM [R,E] Յ 0 for a sufficiently small (even strictly positive) annual fee set by electronic cash card issuers. In this case merchants always prefer electronic cash cards over currency. This follows from Assumption 1 that implies that electronic cash card transactions are less time consuming than currency transactions. Note that annual fees (on any card) generate exclusion of small transactions, therefore section 3 below demonstrates how this exclusion enters the profit function of an electronic cash card issuer. Finally, the merchants for whom electronic cash card transactions are less costly than charge cards transaction satisfy hence,
Buyers
The buyers in our model are shoppers who purchase goods and services from merchants. A buyer can always use currency to pay for the transaction, and may use an electronic cash card or a charge card only if the merchant agrees to accept these cards. The per-transaction buyers' costs of using each means of payment are:
• Currency:
The value of lost time, denoted by τ R B , associated with sorting out notes and coins, handing them out at the cashier, and checking change.
(ii) Loss of money with probability λ R B . (iii) Foregone interest costs denoted by (ν · i)t, where i is the market interest rate and ν is the buyers' length of the holding period of currency relative to that of the merchants (typically, ν Ͼ 1).
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Altogether, the nonfee per-transaction cost facing a buyer engaging in a transaction of size t using currency is (5)
• Electronic Cash Card: Buyers using electronic cash cards face the following nonfee costs.
(i)
Value of lost time, τ E B .
(ii) Loss of the card with probability λ E B . (iii) Loss of e-cash due to a card failure resulting in a loss of reading capability, with probability of γ E B . This cost highlights the limitation of the electronic cash card technology. On one hand electronic cash cards allow anonymity as once the cash is loaded onto the card the transactions cannot be traced. On the other hand, it is precisely because of the anonymity that the loss of cash cannot be recovered when, for example, the chip on the card exhibits reading errors. (iv) Foregone interest loss, similar to currency, once the card is loaded with cash the holder loses potential interest earnings.
Altogether, the nonfee per-transaction cost facing a buyer engaging in a transaction of size t using an electronic cash card is:
In addition, each buyer who holds an electronic cash card pays an annual fee of f A B→E to the issuer of this card.
• Charge cards: Buyers who use charge cards are secured against theft and loss since most issuers guarantee full protection within twenty-four hours of notification. We assume that, just as merchants, the buyers also do not incur foregone interest cost in charge card transactions. As pointed out by a referee, today's buyers who use charge cards may incur negative interest costs as they may not be charged for weeks after the completion of the transactions. In Israel, for example, domestic transactions are charged only once a month, however, international transactions are charged instantaneously, unless the buyer agrees to pay high interest for this credit. In the present paper we treat charge cards as debit cards that directly link to the holders' bank accounts. However, buyers bear some loss of time cost which we denote by τ C B . In addition, each buyer who holds a charge card pays an annual fee of f A B→C to the issuer of this card, and similar to merchants, may be charged f T B→C per transaction, and a proportional fee of f B→C .
The first part is similar to Assumption 1 indicating that electronic cash card transactions are the least time costly, whereas currency transactions are the most time costly. The second part provides some measurement on how differences in buyers' time spent on utilizing the different payment media relative to currency. This assumption is needed to maintain consistency of buyers' preferences among the three payment media.
From the above description we see that electronic cash card transactions are more costly to buyers than currency transactions if and only if hence,
Note that the annual fee appears as a transaction fee since in this paper we assumed that each buyer performs only one transaction. Thus, as with the case of merchants, the annual fee on electronic cash cards can be used to exclude buyers.
Continuing the analysis of buyers' decisions, electronic cash card transactions are less costly to buyers than charge card transactions if and only if hence if and only if 
Conditions (8) and (9) reveal that the annual fee and transaction fee on charge card transactions affect buyers in the same way. Indeed, section 3 below demonstrates that the card issuer can dispense one of these fees.
Coexistence of Multiple Payment Media
The key issue behind the determination of equilibrium usage of payment media is that currency is the legal tender. Hence, either party to the transaction can insist that currency will be used as the means of payment if this party finds it beneficial to do so. A referee correctly pointed out, however, that our assumption that the legal tender is enforceable in any transaction is too strong. In fact, unmanned transactions such as venting machines, public telephones, and highway toll machines may limit the use of certain coins. In what follows we assume that if merchants' and buyers' (first) choice of payment media for a given transaction size do not match, the transaction will take place using currency which is the only legal tender. Thus, we rule out the possibility that the parties will bargain and utilize side payments to reach a decision which payment will be used when their more preferred choices do not coincide. Figure 1 combines conditions (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), and (9), and demonstrates that electronic cash cards and charge cards are refused by one of the parties to midsized transactions. Figure 1 demonstrates that both merchants and buyers engaging in large transactions would prefer using charge cards to any other payment medium. Similarly, merchants and buyers engaging in small transactions would prefer using electronic cash cards as long as the card issuer impose sufficiently low annual fees on merchants and buyers. The currency transaction domain consists mostly of transactions in which merchants' and buyers' most preferred payment media do not coincide, in which case the legal tender (currency) is utilized. Note as long as the actual fees are not specified we are unable to determine the relative sizes of these transaction domains. In fact, high annual fees on electronic cash cards could eliminate them from the market. Similarly, high fees could reduce (or eliminate) the use of charge cards. With so many possible fees on transactions utilizing cards as media of exchange, the reader may lose the intuition behind the equilibrium choice of means of payments in this economy. For this reason it is instructive to look at an economy where all cards are distributed for free, say, by the relevant banks (who may charge buyers and merchants for other services and use the cards as a marketing strategy in order to attract customers to open accounts).
Coexistence of Multiple Payment Media in the Absence of Fees
Looking at merchants first, applying Assumption 1, we have that with the absence of fees conditions (2), (3), and (4) become This means that currency is not the most preferred means of payment for any type t merchant. Merchants specializing in small transactions (for example, vending machines) would prefer to be paid with electronic cash cards, whereas merchants specializing in large transactions would prefer charge cards.
Looking now at the buyers, in the absence of fees conditions (7), (8), and (9) become Assumption 1 guarantees that all the three conditions are consistent for each buyer t. Hence all buyers prefer using charge cards over currency. Buyers of "expensive" items would prefer paying with charge cards, and others would prefer electronic cash cards.
Figure 2 combines merchants' and buyers' preferences to obtain the transaction domains actually used for each type of payment medium. Thus, in the absence of fees, Figure 1 becomes Figure 2 which illustrates how currency is utilized for midsized transactions because merchants' and buyers' preferences over other means of payments do not match.
The present analysis manifests the role played by currency as the unique legal tender which serves as a compromise between merchants and buyers with conflicting preferences over payment media resulting from differences in transaction costs. In addition, Figure 2 illustrates how the roles the value of time plays in the determina-/ ,ˆ/ , / .
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0 and tion of the payment media used. The differences τ C M Ϫ τ E M and τ C B Ϫ τ E B measure the saving in time by using electronic cash cards compared with charge cards. These time differences in losses of time stem from the buyers' credit verification process that is required by the charge card issuers. Such verification does not exist in electronic cash card transactions since these transaction don't go through any centralized system.
Finally, we wish to alert the reader to the role played by the parameter γ E B , which measures the probability of a card failure, as we believe that the possibility of realizing a card (magnetic) reading error deters many buyers from using electronic cash cards. We, therefore, attribute the slow adoption of this card to the failure of issuers to convince the public that their technology is reliable which would, in our framework, reduce the parameter γ E B thereby enlarging the transaction domain of the electronic cash card.
Welfare Analysis in the Absence of Fees
In this framework it is impossible to provide a comprehensive welfare analysis of optimal transaction domains of payment media because such a welfare assessment should involve the calculation of investment, setup, and equipment costs which have been ignored in the present version of the paper, and in addition a precise knowledge of buyers' and merchants' distribution functions.
However, it is possible to gain some insights by looking at the aggregate sum of a buyer's and a merchant's physical costs of using any of the three payment media for one particular transaction. Using this welfare criterion, an electronic cash card transaction is socially preferred to a currency transaction of size t if Note that this calculation is similar to the calculations leading to (3) and (7); however, here we sum up merchants' and buyers' costs. Hence, Figure 2 implies that the socially optimal transaction domain may exceed the actual domain in which the electronic cash card is used, in which case we can state that electronic cash card transactions are underutilized from a social viewpoint. The reason for this result lies in the fact the cutoff transactions are determined either by merchants or by buyers, but not both. Thus, in economies with legal tender the market solutions are not determined by the economywide sum of transaction costs associated with currency.
FEE DETERMINATION
In this section we set up the profit-maximization fee-determination problems solved by the card issuers, assuming that there is only one issuer for each type of cards. A more general model would include imperfect competition among issuers of the same card, where differentiation is generated by switching costs associated with having buyers maintaining bank accounts with different banks that also issue different cards. Clearly, such an extension is beyond the scope of this paper.
Electronic Cash Card Issuer
Unlike the charge card issuer, an electronic cash card issuer is unable to levy twoor three-part tariffs on merchants and buyers since (just like currency transactions) electronic cash card transactions (for example, the Mondex system) are anonymous and do not go through any central registry. Thus, an electronic cash card issuer is restricted to charging only a fixed fee, which takes the form of annual fees in the present model. Therefore, in view of Figure 1 the electronic cash card issuer chooses f A M→E and f A B→E that solve (11) where x ϭ max{0,tˆM [R,E] ,tˆB [R,E] }, y ϭ min{tˆM [E,C] ,tˆB [E,C] }, and tˆM [R,E] , tˆB [R,E] , tˆM [E,C] , and tˆM [E,C] are given in (3), (7), (4), and (8), respectively. Clearly, without any further restrictions on the model, it is impossible to derive a single characterization of the optimal annual fees. There are two reasons for that. First, profit-maximizing annual fees would be sensitive to the specifications of merchants' and buyers' density functions. Second, varying the merchants' annual fee relative to buyers' annual fee may change the relative transaction domains as determined by the upper and lower bounds on the integral equation (11). The two-dimensional profit-maximization problem (11) can be solved only numerically for the general case. In addition, we are able to characterize a simple solution which is valid for some parameters of the model. In this parameter range, the
issuer will capture the entire small transaction domain, by reducing the annual fees to the level satisfying tˆM [R,E] ϭ tˆB [R,E] ϭ 0. In this case (3) and (7) imply that This condition assumes that b(t)/m(t) does not decline very fast, as otherwise it should be written as a minimum over t in the relevant domain. Thus, annual fees are set so that they extract the value of time saved by using electronic cash cards relative to currency.
Charge Card Issuer
For the sake of brevity, we refrain from writing the profit function of the charge card issuer, as it requires the writing of a long integral over six possible fees over the domain where the lower bound is given in Figure 1 and the upper bound still needs to be assumed. Instead, in what follows we logically derive these fees. This procedure is likely to succeed since, unlike the issuer of the electronic cash card, the issuer of the charge card can potentially levy a three part tariff thereby extracting the entire surplus from merchants and buyers at the desired transaction domain (to be calculated below).
The unique feature of the charge card is that each transaction involves a credit verification cost, V C , to be borne by the issuer who maintains the computer system and the phone lines used for credit verifications. Therefore, the issuer should exclude all transaction yielding a combined revenue lower than V C . Without going into details, we assume that V C is sufficiently large so that the issuer of the charge card will not find it profitable to compete with the electronic cash card and currency for small transactions. Also, assume that the ratio of buyers to merchants is constant (independent of t), hence given by b/m. Then, the following fee structure is both feasible and extracts maximal surplus from merchants and buyers: f A M→C ϭ f A B→C ϭ 0 (no annual fees), A close look at these fees reveals that they make merchants and buyers indifferent between using charge cards and electronic cash cards for given annual fees set by the electronic cash card issuer. However, in order to make all transaction profitable, the charge card issuer must exclude all transactions satisfying
as the fees do not cover the credit verification cost. Note that annual fees are not needed in order to extract all the surplus. As for buyers, the charge card issuer can substitute an annual fee for the per-transaction fee (here at a one-to-one ratio, but in general at a different fixed ratio). This substitution is commonly practiced. For example, Israeli charge card issuers promise to void the $60 annual fee for international cards if the buyer uses the card at least six times a month on an annual average basis.
CONCLUSION
Electronic cash cards can displace currency at least for small transactions. Assuming away transition and adjustment costs, the introduction of the electronic cash card technology is socially welfare improving since buyers and merchants' aggregate cost of acquiring, holding, maintaining, and transacting using means of payments is reduced.
The transaction domains of the different payment instruments are as follows. The smallest transactions will paid for with electronic cash cards. However, extremely small transactions, such as transactions with values close to the smallest legal tender, may be paid with coins if annual fees on electronic cash cards are high. The mediumsized transactions will be paid for with currency, although under certain parameter range currency may vanish entirely. The largest transactions will be paid for with account-based media such as charge cards and checks.
Since electronic cash card transactions are anonymous (that is, do not have to clear through any central registry), the issuer of this card must resort to the imposition of an annual fee only. Since the imposition of a two-or a three-part tariff is not feasible, a market failure is likely to occur simply because the issuer is unable to extract the entire surplus from merchants and buyers. Therefore the annual fees imposed for the electronic cash card depends on (a) the market structure (monopoly versus several competing card issuers), and (b) most importantly, on the cost of transacting with the alternative means of payments (currency and charge cards).
Our welfare analysis reveals an overutilization of currency over electronic cash card transactions. The existence of an inherent market failure follows from the fact that under the legal tender system the cutoff transaction size is determined by either the buyer's or merchant's payment transaction but not both. 
